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Washburn Law Journal Online

Instability Ahead! Kansas Parents Should Proceed with Cuation: Why a De Facto Parentage Balancing Test Is the Next Logical Step After In re Parentage of M.F., 475 P.3d 642 (Kan. 2020)

Rylee M. Broyles | September 29, 2021 | Read this comment

Summary: In In re M.F., the Kansas Supreme Court finally laid to rest the confusion surrounding the issue of whether written co-parenting agreements are required to recognize legal parentage of a nonbiological parent in an Artificial Reproductive Technology (“ART”) case. Its proclamation: written co-parenting agreements are not required. This clarification—as necessary as it was—left in its wake a bigger question: what is required to establish legal parentage for nonbiological parents? This unresolved question should be answered in the form of a de facto parent balancing test. Such a test will provide Kansas courts with the stability of predetermined elements while still giving them the flexibility to consider the totality of the circumstances in an area of the law where every case is unique.

Preferred Citation: Rylee M. Broyles, Instability Ahead!  Kansas Parents Should Proceed with Caution: Why a De Facto Parentage Balancing Test Is the Next Logical Step After In re Parentage of M.F., 475 P.3d 642 (Kan. 2020), 61 Washburn L.J. Online  (2021), https://washburnlaw.edu/wljonline/broyles-instability-ahead.

Res Judi-can't-a: Can't a Plaintiff Get a Hearing on the Merits? [479 P.3d 482 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).]

Emily R. Brandt | September 15, 2021 | Read this comment

Summary: The Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of res judicata in Stanfield v. Osborne Industries resulted in Kansas plaintiffs’ being denied their proverbial day in court. The court held that once a federal court dismisses state law claims without prejudice by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, res judicata bars those claims from any subsequent lawsuit in a state court. Although such a scenario is not common, the Stanfield rule has shuttered courtroom doors to plaintiffs whose state law claims never received a hearing on the merits. Kansas should return to conventional principles of res judicata and permit plaintiffs to go forward with their state law claims in state court after a federal court dismisses them without adjudicating them on the merits.

Preferred Citation: Emily R. Brandt, Res Judi-can't-a: Can't a Plaintiff Get a Hearing on the Merits?, 61 Washburn L.J. Online  (2021), https://washburnlaw.edu/wljonline/brandt-res-judi.

Mo’ Money, Mo’ Problems: An Analysis of In Re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation [958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020).]

Benjamin S. Bigham | May 28, 2021 | Read this comment

Summary: In In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the NCAA violated Section I of the Sherman Act by placing restrictions on educational benefits available to student-athletes as forms of compensation. This opinion has now been granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court and will be reviewed to determine if the lower court correctly held that the NCAA violated federal antitrust laws with its current compensation structure. This Comment will evaluate likelihood of success of the holding rendered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation. Ultimately, this Comment will describe why—given the recent developments in case law concerning NCAA compensation rules, the narrow holdings in the lower courts, how concretely the relevant market is defined, and the shifting public opinion in favor of compensating student-athletes—the Supreme Court should affirm these holdings and find that the NCAA has violated Section I of the Sherman Act.

Preferred Citation: Benjamin S. Bigham, Mo’ Money Mo’ Problems: An Analysis of In Re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, 60 Washburn L.J. Online 113 (2021), https://washburnlaw.edu/wljonline/bigham-mo-money-mo-problems.

Boston Bomber’s Death Sentence Should Not Have Been Vacated Based on Insufficient Voir Dire [United States v. Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2020).]

MacKenzie K. McCoy | May 5, 2021 | Read this comment

Summary: In July 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the death sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Boston Marathon bomber, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. The court of appeals stated that the voir dire process was inadequate due to prejudicial pretrial publicity. Voir dire is a process in which potential juror impartiality or bias is assessed through an attorney or judge asking prospective jurors specific questions. Judges have broad discretion during voir dire, and it does not have to follow an exact formula. The district judge in this case gave over one thousand potential jurors a 100-item questionnaire that covered their backgrounds, social media habits, views on the death penalty, and exposure to pretrial publicity. Given the magnitude and severity of the case, the district judge conducted voir dire in an appropriate and efficient manner and, therefore, the court of appeals should not have vacated the death sentence based on an insufficient voir dire process.

Preferred Citation: MacKenzie K. McCoy, How the Supreme Court Got It Wrong: Kansas v. Glover, 60 Washburn L.J. Online 103 (2021), https://washburnlaw.edu/wljonline/mccoy-boston-bomber.

 

Volume 61 Cases Reviewed