Instability Ahead! Kansas Parents Should Proceed with Caution: Why a De Facto Parentage Balancing Test Is the Next Logical Step After In re Parentage of M.F., 475 P.3d 642 (Kan. 2020)
Rylee M. Broyles | September 29, 2021 | PDF Version (187 KB)
Summary: In In re M.F., the Kansas Supreme Court finally laid to rest the confusion surrounding the issue of whether written co-parenting agreements are required to recognize legal parentage of a nonbiological parent in an Artificial Reproductive Technology (“ART”) case. Its proclamation: written co-parenting agreements are not required. This clarification—as necessary as it was—left in its wake a bigger question: what is required to establish legal parentage for nonbiological parents? This unresolved question should be answered in the form of a de facto parent balancing test. Such a test will provide Kansas courts with the stability of predetermined elements while still giving them the flexibility to consider the totality of the circumstances in an area of the law where every case is unique.
Preferred Citation: Rylee M. Broyles, Instability Ahead! Kansas Parents Should Proceed with Caution: Why a De Facto Parentage Balancing Test Is the Next Logical Step After In re Parentage of M.F., 475 P.3d 642 (Kan. 2020), 61 Washburn L.J. Online (2021), https://washburnlaw.edu/wljonline/broyles-instability-ahead.
I. Introduction
On November 6, 2020, the Kansas Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in In re M.F. regarding the parentage of nonbiological parents who conceive via artificial reproductive technology (“ART”).[1] The court’s decision has far-reaching implications for same-sex couples who conceive children through ART.[2] However, the holdings of the case do not fully protect same-sex couples who choose to create a family through ART.[3]
In In re M.F., the court unequivocally declared that written co-parenting agreements are not required in ART cases.[4] However, the court failed to demarcate what is required to establish parentage in such cases.[5] This omission caused a gap in the law that will undoubtedly result in more litigation on these issues as an increasing number of Kansas couples turn to ART to create families.
To eliminate the existing gap in the law, the Kansas legislature should adopt a de facto parentage balancing test to prevent future disputes of unconventional parenting arrangements from having to be argued to the state’s highest court.[6] Not only would such a test provide transparency regarding what is required to establish parentage, but it would also allow for courts to consistently apply the same test to cases that will undoubtedly be diverse in their factual backgrounds.
II. Background
A. In re Parentage of M.F.
K.L. and T.F. began a romantic relationship in 2007.[7] In 2008, T.F. moved into K.L.’s home in Andover, Kansas.[8] Shortly after moving in together, K.L. added T.F.’s name to the mortgage and deed of the home previously owned solely by K.L.[9] The couple also opened a joint checking account for household expenses including mortgage payments and repairs.[10]
The couple never married.[11] Although K.L. asked T.F. to get married “many times,” T.F. always rejected the idea.[12] T.F. later testified that she and K.L. “never considered formalizing their relationship with a commitment ceremony.”[13] However, in 2011, after K.L. lost her job, T.F. added K.L. to her employer-provided medical insurance coverage.[14] In order to procure health insurance for K.L., “T.F. submitted affidavits that [K.L. and T.F.] were domestic partners and intended to continue their relationship indefinitely.”[15]
In 2012, T.F. used artificial insemination to have a child.[16] T.F.’s first attempt at artificial insemination was unsuccessful.[17] K.L. was not present for the insemination procedure, and she was unaware that T.F. had the procedure until afterwards.[18] K.L. was, however, present for the second insemination, which was successful.[19] T.F. gave birth to M.F. in October 2013.[20]
A year after M.F.’s birth, the couple separated.[21] Upon separation, T.F. and M.F. moved out of K.L.’s home and into a home in Inman, Kansas.[22] T.F. allowed K.L. to visit M.F. in Inman.[23] T.F., however, forbade K.L. from having overnight visits with M.F.[24] T.F. only allowed K.L. to have supervised visitation with M.F.[25] K.L. was unable to visit M.F. often because “by the time [K.L.] could drive to Inman after work...[M.F.] would already be in bed.”[26]
i. District Court
In November 2015, K.L. petitioned to establish parentage.[27] After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that T.F. was “the sole legal parent of this child and that she’ll make the decisions regarding who this child sees and under what conditions she sees them.”[28]
In reaching this decision, the court found that the couple made “no joint decision to have children or to raise a child together.”[29] Specifically, the court found that T.F. “wanted to have a child in the worst way” and she was going to do so despite K.L.’s lack of acquiescence.[30] The court noted that although T.F. consulted K.L. regarding the insemination, ultimately, the decision was T.F.’s alone.[31]
Additionally, the court found that T.F. undertook the primary parenting responsibilities and that she was “overwhelmingly was the caring parent” to M.F.[32] The court noted that, while K.L. was present and supportive, the actual “hands-on parenting” was conducted by T.F. Consequently, the court could not find that T.F. and K.L. shared joint responsibility for M.F.’s care.[33]
The court ultimately concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of a mother and child relationship between K.L. and M.F.[34] As a result, the court denied K.L.’s request for a declaration of parentage because K.L. “had a passive rather than an active role” in parenting M.F.[35] The district court concluded that T.F. was the sole legal parent of M.F.[36] K.L. subsequently appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals.[37]
ii. Kansas Court of Appeals
K.L. raised two issues on appeal to the Kansas Court of Appeals.[38] First, K.L. argued that she and T.F. had an oral co-parenting agreement for M.F.[39] On this issue, the appellate court held that K.L. failed to identify any essential elements of an oral co-parenting agreement because K.L. only argued that she and T.F. were “on the same page” regarding co-parenting M.F.[40]
Second, K.L. argued that K.L. openly and notoriously asserted her parentage of M.F. so as to be legally recognized as her parent.[41] On this second issue, the appellate court upheld the district court’s finding that K.L. failed “to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a presumption of parentage” because a “finding on whether an individual is a presumed parent under the [Kansas Parentage Act] is a finding of fact.”[42]
Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling.[43] In doing so, the appellate court held that K.L. “failed to show that the district court erred in finding that she did not notoriously represent herself to others as M.F.’s parent.”[44]
1. Legal Background
a. Kansas Parentage Act
The Kansas Parentage Act (“KPA”) applies in actions concerning parentage of a child.[45]
The KPA defines “parent and child relationship” as “the legal relationship existing between a child and the child’s biological or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties and obligations.”[46] This relationship “includes the mother and child relationship and the father and child relationship.”[47] Notably, any child conceived through “heterologous artificial insemination [is] considered at law in all respects the same as a naturally conceived child.”[48]
The KPA also delineates how a parent and child relationship may be established.[49] Under the KPA, a parent may also establish paternity “by a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity.”[50] Such a voluntary acknowledgment can be accomplished through a written statement under section 23-2204 of the KPA.[51] Without a written statement, a parent may create a “presumption of paternity” pursuant to section 23-2208 of the KPA.[52]
A woman—other than the biological mother—seeking legal recognition of a parent and child relationship under the KPA must first satisfy one of the presumptions of paternity outlined in section 23-2208(a).[53] A presumption of paternity “may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.”[54] If the presumption is sufficiently rebutted, the burden of proving the existence of a parent and child relationship reverts to the party asserting the relationship.[55]
b. Frazier v. Goudschaal
In Frazier v. Goudschaal,[56] a same-sex partner brought an action against her former partner requesting enforcement of a co-parenting agreement regarding their two children whom they conceived via ART.[57] Before the birth of each child, the couple signed a co-parenting agreement which identified the nonbiological mother as a de facto parent and stated that “all major decisions affecting [the] children...shall be made jointly by both parties.”[58]
Then, when the parties’ relationship ended, the nonbiological mother sought enforcement of the co-parenting agreement.[59] The trial court found the co-parenting agreement valid but concluded that it was in the children’s best interest to award joint legal custody and primary residential custody to the biological mother.[60]
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order and upheld the co-parenting agreement, concluding that the agreement did not violate public policy and was enforceable as a matter of law.[61] In conclusion, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the district court had the authority “to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship between” the nonbiological mother and the children.[62] The court also held that courts have the authority “to determine the validity and effect of the co-parenting agreement; and to enter such orders with respect to child custody, parenting time, and child support that are in the best interests of the children.”[63]
III. Court’s Decision
In In re M.F., the Kansas Supreme Court began its analysis by remarking that the KPA does not require a written co-parenting agreement.[64] According to the court, a nonbiological parent does not have to show a “meeting of the minds” to support a written or oral co-parenting agreement.[65] Further, the nonbiological parent does not need to prove they are a “de facto, psychological, equitable, or functional parent.”[66] To prove parentage, K.L. was required to show “that she notoriously recognized her maternity, including the rights it would give her and the duties it would impose upon her.”[67]
Ultimately, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case because the lower court should have—but did not—determine whether K.L. acknowledged her maternity, not whether she performed her motherly duties affably.[68]
A. Court’s Additional Guidance for Proceedings on Remand
After the court declared error in the lower proceedings, it attempted to elucidate the proper rule of law in the burgeoning area of same-sex couples who conceive children through ART.[69]
First, the court, in no uncertain terms, held that the KPA does not require proof of a written or oral co-parenting agreement between parties.[70] However, the court also noted that, in accordance with the United States Supreme Court case Troxel v. Granville,[71] proof of T.F.’s consent to co-parenting with K.L. at the time of M.F.’s birth was required.[72] However, the court cautioned that “to allow anyone—even one with no relationship of any kind with the birth mother—to unilaterally pursue parenthood under this presumption has the potential to lead to unconstitutional as well as absurd results.”[73]
Additionally, the court held that “a birth mother’s consent to share parenting may be implicit or explicit, subject to proof by direct or circumstantial evidence, testimonial or documentary.”[74] For example, the court mused, “[a] birth mother’s explicit testimony of her hope to share parenting with a partner could qualify as direct evidence of consent to share her parental rights to make decisions about care, custody, and control of a child.”[75]
IV. Commentary
The court’s opinion in In re M.F. could not be clearer that written or oral co-parenting agreements are not required.[76] However, the court failed to outline what is required.[77] Although the court provided a few examples of what lower courts should consider when making a determination of legal parentage, the requirements are far from clear or concrete.[78]
This Comment first discusses two de facto parentage tests deployed in other jurisdictions. Then, it argues that Kansas should adopt a “de facto parentage balancing test” to allow for a clear test in an area of the law that is often rife with variability. A de facto balancing test will produce the best outcomes for families in cases of same-sex couples who conceive children through ART, because it will allow courts to look at the totality of the circumstances while providing parents with a clear list of factors that will allow them to be deemed a legal parent.
A. De Facto Parentage Tests from Other Jurisdictions
i. Washington State De Facto Parentage Test
Courts in Washington apply a five-part balancing test to determine whether a nonbiological parent can be recognized as a legal parent.[79] Each element of the five-part test must be met to establish de facto parentage.[80]
The first element of the Washington test requires “that the natural or legal parent consented to and fostered the parent-like relationship.”[81] The second part of the test requires that the alleged parent and the child lived together in the same household.[82] The third part of the de facto parentage test requires the alleged parent to have “assumed the obligations of parenthood without expectation of financial compensation.”[83] Fourth, the test requires that the alleged parent be in a parental role for a sufficient length of time as to have established a “bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature” with the child.[84] Lastly, the fifth element of the test requires the alleged parent to have “fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child's life.”[85]
ii. Washington D.C.’s De Facto Parent Statute
Washington D.C. has codified its de facto parentage test.[86] Under its statutory scheme, D.C. allows for two different avenues that alleged parents may take to establish legal parentage.[87] Notably, however, D.C. requires all elements listed to be established under both tests in order for an alleged parent to successfully gain legal parentage.[88]
First under D.C.’s statute, a “de facto parent” must be an individual who:
(i) Lived with the child in the same household at the time of the child’s birth or adoption by the child’s parent;
(ii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child’s parent; and
(iii) Has held himself or herself out as the child’s parent with the agreement of the child's parent or, if there are 2 parents, both parents.[89]
Additionally, under the second test, a de facto parent is an individual who:
(i) Has lived with the child in the same household for at least 10 of the 12 months immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or motion for custody;
(ii) Has formed a strong emotional bond with the child with the encouragement and intent of the child’s parent that a parent-child relationship form between the child and the third party;
(iii) Has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child’s parent; and
(iv) Has held himself or herself out as the child’s parent with the agreement of the child’s parent, or if there are 2 parents, both parents.[90]
A parent may use either route to establish de facto parentage in Washington D.C.[91] However, each element of the chosen test must be met in order to establish legal parentage.[92]
A Proposed De Facto Parentage Balancing Test for Kansas
While Washington and Washington D.C. provide a good jumping off point for a de facto test, neither test is ideal.[93] Thus, this Comment proposes that Kansas adopt its own test using some of the factors from other jurisdictions, but also adding some of its own factors that other jurisdictions have not included.
First, Washington and Washington D.C. both delineate a strict test; each element of which must be satisfied in order for an alleged parent to earn the legal status of a de facto parent.[94] Such a strict, bright line test should not be used in an area that is rife with multiplicity and murky gray areas.[95] Instead, the test should be flexible: a balancing test that allows the court to consider the totality of the circumstances in determining legal parentage.
Additionally, the Washington and Washington D.C. tests do not consider what is in the best interests of the child.[96] While it could be argued that the tests themselves are meant to be in the best interest of the child, the courts should be able to consider the best interests of the child as a distinct factor. This will allow the courts to take each child’s individual wants and needs into consideration when making a determination of parentage.
Thus, Kansas should adopt its own de facto parentage test, which should be a balancing test, rather than a strict element test. In determining de facto parentage, Kansas courts should properly consider and weigh the following factors:
(1) Whether the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the nonbiological parent’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child.[97]
(2) Whether the nonbiological parent and the child “lived together in the same household” for a significant period of the child’s life.[98]
(3) Whether the nonbiological parent assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education, and development, including contributing towards the child’s support.[99]
(4) Whether the nonbiological parent “assumed the obligations of parenthood without expectation of financial compensation.”[100]
(5) Whether the nonbiological parent has been in a “parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature” with the child.[101]
(6) Whether the nonbiological parent has held himself or herself out to be the child’s parent.[102]
(7) Whether the nonbiological parent “formed a strong emotional bond with the child.”[103]
(8) Whether the nonbiological parent’s bond with the child was formed “with the encouragement and intent of the child’s parent that a parent-child relationship form between the child and the third party.”[104]
(9) Whether the nonbiological parent “has taken on full and permanent responsibilities as the child’s parent.”[105]
(10) Whether establishing de facto parentage is in the best interests of the child.[106]
In creating this balancing test, the court should clarify that no single factor is dispositive.
The proposed test would provide Kansas courts with the flexibility to consider the totality of the circumstances, while still giving them—and Kansas parents—guidelines when considering whether a nonbiological parent should be granted legal parentage.
V. Conclusion
While the court’s decisions in In re M.F. was an important steppingstone for nonbiological parents in Kansas, the state has a long way to go to fully clarify what is expected of these parents.[107] Although the Kansas Supreme Court cleared up the debate about whether a written or oral co-parenting agreement is required for legal recognition of parentage for same-sex couples in ART cases, the court left much to be desired regarding what actually is required to establish legal parentage in these instances.[108]
Kansas should adopt a de facto parentage balancing test for determining legal parentage of a nonbiological parent. Such a test will allow the court the flexibility to consider the totality of the circumstances in the various family and child-rearing arrangements. Nonbiological parents and biological parents alike should be able to know the factors that a court will apply when determining if they are a parent.
No two parenting arrangements are the same and, therefore, a strict, bright line test cannot be used to determine when someone is a parent of a child. Kansas families—especially Kansas children—deserve the stability that a de facto balancing test would provide.
1. See generally In re M.F., 475 P.3d 642 (Kan. 2020). [Return to Text]
2. See id. at 660. [Return to Text]
3. See generally id. [Return to Text]
4. See id. [Return to Text]
5. See id. [Return to Text]
6. The Kansas Supreme Court had the opportunity to adopt a de facto parentage balancing test in In re M.F.; however, the court declined to do so. See id. [Return to Text]
7. Id. at 644. [Return to Text]
8. Id. [Return to Text]
9. Id. [Return to Text]
10. Id. [Return to Text]
11. See id. at 645. [Return to Text]
12.Id. [Return to Text]
13. Id. [Return to Text]
14. Id. at 644. [Return to Text]
15. Id. at 645. Later, however, T.F. testified that “she added K.L. to her insurance as a matter of financial necessity, rather than as a statement about the couple’s status.” Id. [Return to Text]
16. Id. [Return to Text]
17. Id. [Return to Text]
18. Id. [Return to Text]
19. Id. [Return to Text]
20. Id. [Return to Text]
21. Id. at 646. T.F. broke up with K.L. for several reasons including “‘spirituality and sexuality,’ financial pressures, and concerns about the couple’s relationship.” Id. [Return to Text]
22. See id. at 645. [Return to Text]
23. Id. [Return to Text]
24. Id. at 646. T.F. disallowed unsupervised visits between K.L. and M.F. because T.F. “began to question K.L.’s emotional stability and decided it was not in M.F.’s best interests to have overnight visits with her.” Id. at 646. [Return to Text]
25. Id. at 645. [Return to Text]
26. Id. [Return to Text]
27. Id. [Return to Text]
28. Id. at 649. Notably, K.L. failed to take legal action to assert her parentage until five days after T.F. and her husband married. Id. at 650. [Return to Text]
29. Id. at 646. [Return to Text]
30. Id. [Return to Text]
31. Id. K.L.’s involvement in the insemination process “was either required, or it was a decision after [T.F.] had decided to go ahead and do this, that [K.L.] essentially got on board and then assisted to the extent that she could in this planning and insemination process and during the pregnancy.” Id. (alterations in original). [Return to Text]
32. Id. [Return to Text]
33. Id. at 647. The court also found it significant that “the time that the child was in a family unit home with these two partners was relatively short. Only for a period of about a year before their breakup.” Id. [Return to Text]
34. Id. at 648. [Return to Text]
35. Id. [Return to Text]
36. Id. at 649. [Return to Text]
37. Id. [Return to Text]
38. Id. K.L. also posed a third question to the appellate court: “Did T.F. exercise the parental preference doctrine in naming K.L. mother of M.F.? If so, could she change her mind and alter M.F.’s opportunity to have two parents?” Id. However, the appellate court declined to address the merits of this issue because it had not been properly preserved for appellate review. Id. at 650. Conversely, T.F. argued that K.L.’s attempt to establish parentage through a co-parenting agreement or through the Kansas Parentage Act ("KPA") should fail because of the evidence against K.L. Id. at 649. [Return to Text]
39. Id. [Return to Text]
40. Id. [Return to Text]
41. Id. [Return to Text]
42. Id. [Return to Text]
43. Id. at 650. [Return to Text]
44. Id. (emphasis omitted). [Return to Text]
45. Id. at 652; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-2201(b) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess.). The Kansas Parentage Act (“KPA”) is codified as Article 22 of the Kansas Family Law Code. See Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-2201–2225 (Westlaw). [Return to Text]
46. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-2205 (Westlaw). [Return to Text]
47. Id. [Return to Text]
48. § 23-2302. [Return to Text]
49. § 23-2207. [Return to Text]
50. § 23-2207(b). Notably, although this section specifically refers to how a father may establish paternity, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that its application also applies to nonbiological mothers in same-sex relationships in ART cases. See In re M.F., 475 P.3d 642, 654 (Kan. 2020) (“[T]he legal fictions underlying the statutory presumptions of paternity or maternity can be used as the first step in establishing the legal fiction that a non-biological parent is to be treated in law as the biological parent, i.e., bears the rights and duties attendant to a legally binding relationship created before any court's adjudication”); see also Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 552 (Kan. 2013). [Return to Text]
51. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-2204 (Westlaw). [Return to Text]
52. § 23-2208. [Return to Text]
53. In re M.F., 475 P.3d at 654; see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-2208(a)(1)–(6) (Westlaw). [Return to Text]
54. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-2208(b) (Westlaw). [Return to Text]
55. Id. [Return to Text]
56. Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542 (Kan. 2013). [Return to Text]
57. Id. at 546. [Return to Text]
58. Id. (alteration in original). [Return to Text]
59. Id. [Return to Text]
60. Id. at 547. [Return to Text]
61. Id. at 558. The court also held that the agreement provided the children with “substantive legal equality . . . regardless of the marital status of their parents.” Id. [Return to Text]
62. Id. at 553. [Return to Text]
63. Id. [Return to Text]
64. See In re M.F., 475 P.3d 642, 660 (Kan. 2020). [Return to Text]
65. Id. [Return to Text]
66. Id. [Return to Text]
67. Id. (emphasis added). The court also noted that the issue was not “whether K.L. engaged in ‘open and notorious demonstrations of parenting’ or ‘open and notorious assumption of parenting responsibilities’ for M.F. It simply was not necessary that she demonstrate[d] she was an attentive, hands-on, involved mother.” Id. [Return to Text]
68. Id. The court stated that the latter analysis would be proper once and if K.L.’s maternity was established in determining how involved she was allowed to be in M.F.’s life. Id. [Return to Text]
69. Id. at 660–61. [Return to Text]
70. See id. at 660. [Return to Text]
71. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (holding “that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”). [Return to Text]
72. In re M.F., 475 P.3d at 661. On this, the court stated, “[s]uch a consent to shared parentage does not sever or waive T.F.’s due process right to be a parent; provided K.L. has met the statutory requirement of recognition of her maternity, it merely endows K.L. with the same and equal right.” Id. [Return to Text]
73. Id. [Return to Text]
74. Id. [Return to Text]
75. Id. [Return to Text]
76. See id. at 660. [Return to Text]
77. See id. [Return to Text]
78. See id. at 660–61. [Return to Text]
79. See In re Custody of A.F.J., 260 P.3d 889, 897 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d, 314 P.3d 373 (Wash. 2013) (applying the de facto parentage balancing test to a foster parent). [Return to Text]
80. Id. at 899. [Return to Text]
81. Id. at 897. [Return to Text]
82. Id. [Return to Text]
83. Id. at 898. This element of the test may be satisfied even if a parent receives state funds as a result of taking care of the child. See id. The Washington court proffered the following example: “family members who take children into their homes primarily out of family affinity may be de facto parents even if, as a result of taking a child into their home, they are able to qualify for welfare benefits, foster-care payments, or other forms of financial assistance.” Id. [Return to Text]
84. Id. at 899. [Return to Text]
85. Id. [Return to Text]
86. See D.C. Code § 16-831.01 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess.). [Return to Text]
87. See §§ 16-831.01(1)(A)(i)–(iii), 16-831.01(1)(B)(i)–(iv). [Return to Text]
88. See §§ 16-831.01(1)(A)(i)–(iii), 16-831.01(1)(B)(i)–(iv). [Return to Text]
89. § 16-831.01(1)(A)(i)–(iii). [Return to Text]
90. § 16-831.01(1)(B)(i)–(iv). [Return to Text]
91. See §§ 16-831.01(1)(A)(i)–(iii), 16-831.01(1)(B)(i)–(iv). [Return to Text]
92. See §§ 16-831.01(1)(A)(i)–(iii), 16-831.01(1)(B)(i)–(iv). [Return to Text]
93. See In re Custody of A.F.J., 260 P.3d 889, 897 (Wash. App. 2011), aff’d, 314 P.3d 373 (Wash. 2013); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435 (Wis. 1995) (applying the Washington D.C. test to the custody and visitation rights for a biological mother’s former partner). [Return to Text]
94. See In re Custody of A.F.J., 260 P.3d at 897; D.C. Code §§ 16-831.01(1)(A)(i)–(iii), 16-831.01(1)(B)(i)–(iv) (Westlaw). [Return to Text]
95. See In re Custody of A.F.J., 260 P.3d at 897. [Return to Text]
96. Id.; D.C. Code §§ 16-831.01(1)(A)(i)–(iii), (B)(i)–(iv) (Westlaw). [Return to Text]
97. See In re Custody of A.F.J., 260 P.3d at 897. [Return to Text]
98. See id. [Return to Text]
99. See id. at 898. [Return to Text]
100. See id. [Return to Text]
101. See id. [Return to Text]
102. See D.C. Code § 16-831.01(1)(A)(iii) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess.). [Return to Text]
103. § 16-831.01(1)(B)(ii). [Return to Text]
104. Id. [Return to Text]
105. § 16-831.01(1)(B)(iii). [Return to Text]
106. See Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 553 (Kan. 2013). [Return to Text]
107. See In re M.F., 475 P.3d 642, 661–62 (Kan. 2020). [Return to Text]
108. See id. at 661. [Return to Text]
