Juvenile Justice: Authorizing Prosecution as an Adult in Kansas

Mackenzie K. McCoy | December 15, 2021 | PDF Version (192 KB)

Summary: In December 2020, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the Reno Coun­ty District Court’s decision to authorize adult prosecution of fourteen-year-old defendant, Samuel Vonachen. The district court relied upon Kan­sas Statute section 38-2347(d), which enumerates eight factors a court should consider when determining whether to grant the state’s mo­tion to authorize prosecuting a juvenile as an adult. Typically, in Kansas, an individual under the age of eighteen is adjudicated as a juvenile offender. However, if the factors in Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d) are established by a preponderance of the evidence showing that adult prosecution is warranted, the court may grant the state’s motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion by appropriately and accurately applying the factors of Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d) to the facts of Samuel’s case. To overcome the statutory factors outlined in Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d), Samuel needed an argu­ment that would downplay the seriousness of his crimes and demon­strate that society would be better served with him spending time in a juvenile facility rather than spending the rest of his life in prison. However, Samuel failed to do so. Therefore, the Kansas Supreme Court correctly affirmed the district court’s decision.

Preferred Citation: Mackenzie K. McCoy, Juvenile Justice: Authorizing Prosecution as an Adult in Kansas, 61 Washburn L.J. Online 45 (2021), https://washburnlaw.edu/wljonline/mccoy-juvenile-justice.

 

 

I. Introduction

This Comment reviews the precedent of how Kansas courts apply the eight factors in Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d)[1], and discusses how to successfully argue against adult prosecution of a juvenile. Similarly, this Comment analyzes the State v. Vonachen decision and articulates how the Kansas Supreme Court came to the correct conclusion in affirming the district court’s decision to authorize adult prosecution of the fourteen-year-old juvenile defendant, Samuel Vonachen.[2]

II. Background

A. Summary of State v. Vonachen

When he was just fourteen years old, Samuel Vonachen was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of aggravated arson.[3]

In September 2013, Samuel’s father, Steve Vonachen, awoke to the sound of his home’s smoke alarm.[4] Steve then went to the top of the stairs, where he saw the fire downstairs.[5] Steve ran downstairs to try and call for help from the kitchen, but the phone was disconnected.[6] By the time Steve tried to run back upstairs the fire had already spread.[7] Instead of returning upstairs, Steve decided to check outside, where he thought the rest of his family would be.[8] However, once he left the home, Steve realized he was the only member of his family outside, and a neighbor kept Steve from returning inside to rescue his family.[9] Firefighters found Karla Vonachen, Samuel’s mother, and A.V., Samuel’s eleven-year-old sister, unresponsive in the house and both died as a result of the fire.[10]

In the aftermath of the house fire, a police officer observed Samuel walking towards the Vonachen family home and asked Samuel “what he had been doing [for] the last two hours.”[11] Samuel replied that he had “[j]ust been walking around.”[12] Samuel was then taken to the hospital, where it was observed that there were no burn marks on his clothing or person and he smelled like gasoline.[13] Samuel was released from the hospital and taken to his grandparents’ home while Steve went to the police station, listened to the 911 call, and recognized Samuel’s voice.[14]

Later, two detectives interviewed Samuel while Steve was present.[15] About half an hour into the interview, Samuel requested that Steve leave the room.[16] After Steve left the room, Samuel confessed to setting the house on fire while his family was still inside and drew a diagram demonstrating the pour pattern he made with gasoline before setting the house on fire.[17]

Samuel expressed little emotion about the deaths of his sister and mother despite having had a peaceful family relationship with no indications of conflict or abuse.[18] It was later determined that Samuel had an IQ score of 127, placing him in the ninety-sixth percentile compared to kids his age.[19] Although Samuel was only fourteen years old, psychologists determined that he was capable of forming the intent to commit the crimes charged.[20]

The State of Kansas filed a motion to prosecute Samuel as an adult pursuant to Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d).[21] The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the State’s motion, applied the eight factors set out in Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d), and issued a written opinion granting the motion.[22] Accordingly, Samuel was tried as an adult before a jury and was found guilty on all counts.[23] On direct appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, Samuel’s defense argued that the district court (1) interpreted the statute incorrectly, (2) lacked substantial competent evidence to support its findings, and (3) applied the incorrect legal standard.[24]

B. Legal Background

1. Statutory Background

Typically, when a juvenile has committed a serious felony or has a lengthy criminal record, the juvenile can be sentenced to a juvenile correctional facility—often referred to as Direct Commitment.[25] The length of time a juvenile is committed to the facility depends on the crime that was committed and can range “from [three] months to several years,” but a juvenile will always be released when he reaches “a maximum age of [twenty-two-and-a-half] years old.”[26] The juvenile will then be put on “conditional release” in which a juvenile probation officer will monitor the juvenile—much like an adult on probation—until his twenty-third birthday.[27] After his twenty-third birthday, the juvenile is no longer under juvenile jurisdiction.[28] However, if the juvenile is over fourteen years old, the state may file a motion to authorize prosecution of the juvenile as an adult.[29] Kansas Statute section 38-2347 authorizes such prosecution of juveniles as adults in Kansas.[30]

Under Kansas Statute section 38-2347(a)(1) a juvenile offender is “presumed to be a juvenile, and the presumption must be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence” that the juvenile should be charged as an adult.[31] The Kansas Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to mean that:

“The alleged juvenile offender shall be presumed to be an adult” when...the juvenile was “14, 15, 16 or 17 years of age at the time of the offense or offenses alleged in the complaint, if any such offense...[i]f committed by an adult, would constitute an off-grid crime.” And “[i]f the juvenile is presumed to be an adult, the burden is on the juvenile to rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.”[32]

Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d) enumerates eight factors to determine whether to authorize the prosecution of a juvenile as an adult.[33] These factors include the following: (1) the seriousness of the alleged offense and community safety; (2) the manner in which the act was committed—violently or premeditated; (3) “whether the crime was against person or property”; (4) the number of offenses pending against the juvenile; (5) criminal history of the juvenile; (6) sophistication of the juvenile; (7) the rehabilitation options available to the juvenile; and (8) “whether the interests of the juvenile or of the community would be better served by criminal prosecution or extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution.”[34] A court may authorize adult prosecution if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the juvenile should be prosecuted as an adult.[35]

However, the statute indicates that lack of evidence relating to one or more of the above factors “shall not be determinative of the issue.”[36] A district court’s decision to authorize adult prosecution is subject to a dual standard of review.[37] First, there must be substantial competent evidence to support its factual findings and, second, the reviewing court will conduct a legal assessment of the eight factors set out in Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d) to determine if there was an abuse of discretion.[38]

2. Case Law

Samuel’s case is not the first instance in which a juvenile appealed a district court’s decision to authorize adult prosecution in Kansas. In State v. Brown,[39] a thirteen-year-old defendant argued to the Kansas Supreme Court that the district court erred when it authorized for her to be prosecuted as an adult.[40] She argued that the district court should not have analyzed the second and third factors of Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d) in addition to the first factor because an off-grid offense[41] satisfied all three factors, making the second and third factor analysis unnecessary.[42] The Kansas Supreme Court disagreed with this argument.[43] The court found that this argument contravened the statute’s express language that requires the district court to consider each factor—especially when a juvenile could be charged with an off-grid offense.[44]

A similar argument was presented by a sixteen-year-old boy in State v. Reed.[45] In Reed, the juvenile argued that the district court erred in authorizing adult prosecution when it weighed the second and third factors against him when he had already been charged with an off-grid crime.[46] However, the appellate court relied on the recent decision of Brown to reject this argument.[47] Specifically, the Kansas Court of Appeals determined, “[t]he Supreme Court has already shut the door on Reed’s argument.”[48]

III. Court’s Decision

In State v. Vonachen, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision to authorize adult prosecution of Samuel Vonachen despite his arguments that the district court (1) applied the factors from Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d) incorrectly, (2) lacked substantial competent evidence to support its findings, and (3) applied the incorrect legal standard.[49] The Kansas Supreme Court determined that the first three factors are not duplicative—as also stated by the court in State v. Brown[50]—and that it was clear from the statutory language that the first three factors could each be applied in the court’s analysis.[51] Similarly, the court rejected Samuel’s argument that there was no substantial competent evidence upon review of the district court’s analysis regarding Samuel’s actions.[52] Lastly, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that the district court did not apply an incorrect legal standard when it found that the community’s safety could not be guaranteed.[53]

IV. Commentary

The Kansas Supreme Court correctly affirmed the district court’s decision to authorize the adult prosecution of fourteen-year-old Samuel Vonachen.[54] The district court did not abuse its discretion by appropriately and accurately applying the factors of Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d) to the facts of Samuel’s case.[55] The Kansas Supreme Court’s decision demonstrates that the eight factors set out in Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d) are undoubtedly distinct.[56] While there is room for interpretation in every case, the Kansas Court of Appeals and the Kansas Supreme Court have already “shut the door” on the argument that the factors in the statute are redundant.[57]

Kansas Statute section 38-2347 authorizes the state to prosecute juveniles as adults, allowing the state to properly punish them for their adult actions.[58] However, the statute provides juveniles who are not fit to be prosecuted as an adult a way to avoid adult prosecution, despite the crimes they may have committed.[59] The statute also allows district courts to apply the statutory factors to the facts of the case and either determine that adult prosecution is required or determine that juvenile adjudication is proper.[60]

A. Factors One Through Three in Kansas Statute Section 38-2347(d)

On appeal, Samuel argued that the district court should not have authorized the State to prosecute him as an adult.[61] Specifically, Samuel argued that the district court—when it applied the eight factors in Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d)—should not have weighed all of the first three factors against him.[62] The first three factors in the statute examine (1) the seriousness of the crimes committed and the need for community protection; (2) whether the crime was committed in a violent or particularly aggressive manner; and (3) whether the crime was against person or property.[63] Samuel asserted that “the first, second, and third factors necessarily become redundant because off-grid felonies are always serious crimes and offenses are classified as off-grid only when they are committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner.”[64]

The Kansas Supreme Court rejected Samuel’s argument for three reasons.[65] First, the court noted that the first three factors cover different subject matters and indicated that just because all three factors weigh in favor of adult prosecution does not mean the factors are redundant.[66] The same arguments were made in the Brown and Reed cases,[67] and the court has not changed its stance. In Reed, the Kansas Court of Appeals specifically commented on the fact that the Kansas Supreme Court had already rejected this argument.[68] Consequently, juveniles who wish to avoid being prosecuted as an adult need to be aware of the arguments that have previously been made regarding the statute and must persuade the court why their situation is different. Simply arguing that various factors within the statute are duplicative, as Samuel did in this case, will not overturn a conviction stemming from an adult prosecution.[69]

Second, the court analyzed the plain language of Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d) and determined that if the Legislature had intended for the first three factors to be considered as one factor, “it would have said so.”[70] Third, the statute specifically states that the insufficiency of evidence for any one or more of the factors is not determinative of the issue.[71] “This means the Legislature intended a holistic analysis, not simply a numerical calculation of how many factors weighed for or against the juvenile.”[72]

This consideration can be demonstrated by the requirement that the factual findings regarding the statute be supported by substantial competent evidence.[73] The consequences that could result from adult prosecution cannot be overstated. If the State had prosecuted Samuel as a juvenile then, upon conviction, the State would have placed him in a juvenile correctional facility, released him when he was only twenty-two-and-a-half years old, and then monitored him for an additional six months.[74] Therefore, he would have only faced confinement for a total of five-and-a-half years and would have been subsequently released when he reached twenty-two-and-a-half years old.[75] However, since the statute authorized the State to prosecute him as an adult, he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years.[76]

As an example, a juvenile who commits a crime without anyone being injured would be able to overcome the first three factors due to the difference in the situation.[77] In In re D.D.M., the Kansas Supreme Court found that although the juvenile still committed a crime that involved the threat of violence, the juvenile could nevertheless be rehabilitated, and society would benefit from juvenile prosecution.[78] Although every case involves different facts that influence how the factors are applied, the Kansas Supreme Court in Vonachen could not overlook the fact that Samuel killed two innocent people.[79]

B. Factor Four in Kansas Statute Section 38-2347(d)

Samuel argued that the fourth factor—“the number of alleged offenses unadjudicated and pending against the juvenile”—should not have included his current offenses because including them would create a redundancy.[80] The court rejected this argument because such interpretation would require the court to include a meaning in the statute that the Legislature did not intend.[81] Therefore, the statute must be given the effect as it was written.[82] However, the statute does not contain a carveout indicating that the current charges should be excluded from the court’s analysis.[83] As the court has indicated, the plain language of the statute dictates the application of the statute.[84] If the Legislature had not intended current charges to be included in the court’s analysis, the Legislature would have provided for such an exception in the statute.[85]

C. Substantial Competent Evidence to Support the District Court’s Finding

Samuel also asserted that there was not substantial competent evidence to support the district court’s finding that rehabilitation was not available when it analyzed the seventh factor in Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d).[86] In support of his argument, Samuel referred to the testimony of a licensed psychologist who testified at trial that someone at Samuel’s age lacks psychological maturity; therefore, Samuel did not need any treatment at the moment.[87]

The Kansas Supreme Court rejected this argument for two reasons.[88] First, the court indicated that the psychologists’ testimony was neutral at best and, therefore, did not directly support Samuel’s position.[89] Second, the court determined that there was substantial competent evidence to support the district court’s finding.[90] Specifically, the Kansas Supreme Court noted that the district court had reviewed the file, heard testimony, and examined the evidence.[91] Based on the district court’s review of all of the information, it reached the conclusion that the ‘“horrific crime was not predictable or provoked,’ and because of that it was ‘not able to fathom how the juvenile justice system could rehabilitate this young man in eight years.’”[92] Therefore, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that the district court’s findings authorizing adult prosecution were supported by substantial competent evidence.[93]

When comparing Samuel’s case to In re D.D.M., in which the district court found that the juvenile was amenable to rehabilitation, it is understandable why the district court found that rehabilitation was not possible for Samuel.[94] Samuel committed a heinous and unprovoked act against his family, whereas the juvenile in In re D.D.M. did not physically harm anyone and did not commit any off-grid felonies.[95] Rehabilitation is not the same for everyone, and its success is difficult to predict. But when an individual commits such a heinous crime, with no remorse for his actions, it is difficult to fathom how eight years of rehabilitation in a juvenile facility could adequately rehabilitate this person.

D. The District Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard

Finally, Samuel claimed the district court applied the incorrect legal standard when it determined that it could not guarantee the safety of the community or Samuel’s family.[96] Samuel argued that there is nothing in the statute that requires the district court to make such a finding and, therefore, the court shifted Samuel’s burden from preponderance of the evidence to proof beyond all doubt.[97] The Kansas Supreme Court rejected Samuel’s argument by stating that Samuel misunderstood the district court’s finding.[98] The Kansas Supreme Court found that the district court did not demand a heavier burden than required by statute.[99] “[W]hile [the district court] used the term ‘guarantee,’ it did not use it to inflate Samuel’s statutory burden.”[100]

V. Conclusion

The Kansas Supreme Court correctly affirmed the Reno County District Court’s authorization of adult prosecution of fourteen-year-old Samuel Vonachen pursuant to Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d). Despite Samuel’s arguments regarding the district court’s interpretation of the statute, the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision reaffirmed that the statute captures the intent of the Legislature, which was made with proper consideration of the consequences that could result from adult prosecution.

 

1. Throughout the Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Vonachen, the court refers to eight factors set out in K.S.A. 38-2347(e). See generally State v. Vonachen, 476 P.3d 774 (Kan. 2020). However, due to the Kansas State Legislature’s reorganization of the statute, the eight factors are currently listed under K.S.A. 38-2347(d). See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2347 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess. 2021). Therefore, this Comment refers to the statute as Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2347(d). [Return to Text] 2

2. See Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 791. [Return to Text] 

3. Id. at 778. [Return to Text]

4. Id. [Return to Text]

5. Id. [Return to Text]

6. See id. [Return to Text]

7. Id. [Return to Text]

8. See id. [Return to Text]

9. See id. [Return to Text]

10. See id. “Autopsy reports showed Karla and A.V. died of smoke inhalation and thermal injuries.” Id. [Return to Text]

11. Id. [Return to Text]

12. Id. [Return to Text]

13. See id. The fact that Samuel smelled like gasoline was significant to officers because “there was a gas can on the porch and Steve [Vonachen] had said the fire traveled in a line up the stairs.” Furthermore, “Samuel’s clean appearance contrasted with Steve’s. According to the examining nurse, Steve was ‘[j]ust completely covered in soot.’” Id. (alterations in original). [Return to Text]

14. Id. [Return to Text]

15. Id. [Return to Text]

16. Id. [Return to Text]

17. Id. [Return to Text]

18. Id. at 779. Samuel underwent several psychological evaluations, which resulted in Samuel being diagnosed “with ‘Other Specified Personality Disorder’ and ‘AD/HD, combined type.’” Id. This diagnosis stemmed from the fact that Samuel was under the age of eighteen and, therefore, could not be diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder. Id. [Return to Text]

19. Id. at 780. [Return to Text]

20. Id. Samuel was charged “with two counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of aggravated arson.” Id. at 778. [Return to Text]

21. Id. at 788. [Return to Text]

22. Id. [Return to Text]

23. Id. at 778. Samuel was sentenced “to life in prison with no possibility of parole for 25 years for the two first-degree murder convictions, 155 months’ imprisonment for the attempted first-degree murder conviction, and 59 months’ imprisonment for the aggravated arson conviction. The court ordered the sentences to run concurrent to each other.” Id. By the time Samuel was convicted, he was seventeen years old. John Green, Vonachen Receives Life Sentence for Murder of Mother, Sister, The Hutchinson News (July 28, 2017, 6:59 PM), https://www.hutchnews.com/news/20170728/vonachen-receives-life-sentence-for-murder-of-mother-sister [https://perma.cc/EP8N-TK57. [Return to Text]

24. Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 788. [Return to Text]

25. Kan. Legal Servs. Inc., Juvenile Crime and Consequences in Kansas 7 (2011), https://www.kansaslegalservices.org/files/Collateral%20Consequences%20Booklet%20-%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YJR-RHJ9. [Return to Text]

26. Id. [Return to Text]

27. Id. [Return to Text]

28. See id. [Return to Text]

29. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2347(3) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess. 2021). [Return to Text]

30. See id. [Return to Text]

31. § 38-2347(a)(1). [Return to Text]

32. State v. Vonachen, 476 P.3d 774, 789 (Kan. 2020) (quoting Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2347(a)(1)) (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original). [Return to Text]

33. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2347(d) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess. 2021). [Return to Text]

34. Id. [Return to Text]

35. § 38-2347(e)(1). [Return to Text]

36. § 38-2347(d) (emphasis added). [Return to Text]

37. Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 788. [Return to Text]

38. Id. at 788–89. “Substantial evidence ‘is evidence which possesses both relevance and substance and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues can reasonably be resolved.’” Cresto v. Cresto, 358 P.3d 831,835 (Kan. 2015) (quoting In re Farr, 49 P.3d 415, 424 (Kan. 2002)). “Substantial evidence is also ‘such legal and relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as being sufficient to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting In re Estate of Reynolds, 970 P.2d 537, 545 (Kan. 1998)). “A district court abuses its discretion when: (1) no reasonable person would take its view; (2) its ruling is based on an error of law; or (3) substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which the exercise of discretion is based.” Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 789. [Return to Text]

39. State v. Brown, 331 P.3d 781 (Kan. 2014). [Return to Text]

40. Id. at 790. In Brown, the juvenile was convicted “of first-degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery.” Id. at 786. She was sentenced “to a hard 20 life sentence for” the first offense which was to run concurrent to a thirty-two-month sentence for the second charge. Id. [Return to Text]

41. Under Kansas law, “[i]n general, the potential punishment an offender faces can be determined in reference to sentencing grids.” Sentencing Guidelines, Sedgwick Cnty. Dist. Att’y, https://www.sedgwickcounty.org/district-attorney/sentencing-guidelines/ [https://perma.cc/RGE8-NX9V] (last visited Aug. 13, 2021). Sentencing grids consider the severity of the crime that the defendant was convicted of as well as the defendant’s criminal history when assessing punishment. Id. However, the sentencing guidelines for some felonies are dictated by other laws—and sentencing grids are not used to assess punishment. Such offenses are referred to as “off-grid” crimes.  Id. [Return to Text]

42. Brown, 331 P.3d at 790. [Return to Text]

43. See id. [Return to Text]

44. Id. [Return to Text]

45. See State v. Reed, No. 108823, 2015 WL 4878896 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2015). [Return to Text]

46. Id. at *2. [Return to Text]

47. Id. at *3. “Brown was decided while Reed’s petition for review was pending before the Kansas Supreme Court.” Id. [Return to Text]

48. Id. [Return to Text]

49. State v. Vonachen, 476 P.3d 774, 790–91 (Kan. 2020). [Return to Text]

50. State v. Brown, 331 P.3d 781, 790 (Kan. 2014). [Return to Text]

51 .Vonachen, 476 P. 3d at 789–90 (citing Brown, 331 P.3d at 790). [Return to Text]

52. Id. at 790–91. [Return to Text]

53. Id. at 790. [Return to Text]

54. See id. at 791. [Return to Text]

55. Id. at 789–90. [Return to Text]

56. See id. at 789. [Return to Text]

57. See id.; State v. Reed, No. 108823, 2015 WL 4878896, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2015); State v. Brown, 331 P.3d 781, 790 (Kan. 2014). [Return to Text]

58. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2347(d) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess. 2021). [Return to Text]

59. See id. [Return to Text]

60. See id.; In re C.E., No. 95,623, 2006 WL 2595310, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2006). In this case, the Kansas Court of Appeals found that substantial competent evidence was shown to support the district court’s decision in denying the state’s motion to authorize adult prosecution. In re C.E., 2015 WL 4878896, at *5. [Return to Text]

61. Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 787. [Return to Text]

62. Id. at 789. The three factors that Samuel argued should not have been weighed against him are: 

(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protection of the community requires prosecution as an adult or designating the proceeding as an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution; 

(2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner; 

(3) whether the offense was against a person or against property. Greater weight shall be given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted.  

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2347(d)(1)–(3) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess. 2021). First-degree murder in Kansas is an off-grid felony.  § 38-2347(a)(2). An off-grid felony is punishable by death or life imprisonment. Rebecca Pirius, Kansas Felony Crimes by Class and Sentences, NOLO, https://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/criminal-defense/felony-offense/kansas-felony-class.htm#:~:text=Off%2DGrid%20Crimes,punishable%20by%20life%20in%20prison [https://perma.cc/CQB9-CAK5] (last visited Aug. 13, 2021). [Return to Text]

63. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2347(d)(1)–(3). [Return to Text]

64. Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 789 (internal quotations omitted). [Return to Text]

65. Id. at 790. [Return to Text]

66. Id. (citing State v. Brown, 331 P.3d 781, 790 (Kan. 2014)). [Return to Text]

67. See id.; Brown, 331 P.3d at 790; State v. Reed, No. 108823, 2015 WL 4878896, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2015). [Return to Text]

68. Reed, 2015 WL 4878896, at *3. [Return to Text]

69. See Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 789. [Return to Text]

70. Id. at 790. [Return to Text]

71.  Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2347(d) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess. 2021). [Return to Text]

72. Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 790. [Return to Text]

73. Id. at 787; see cases cited supra note 38. [Return to Text]

74. See Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 788. [Return to Text]

75. Green, supra note 23. Samuel was sentenced when he was seventeen years old, therefore he would only have to be confined in a juvenile facility for three-and-a-half years before he was released. See id. [Return to Text]

76. Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 778. [Return to Text]

77. See generally In re D.D.M., 249 P.3d 5 (Kan. 2011). In In re D.D.M., the Kansas Supreme Court denied the State’s motion to authorize adult prosecution of a sixteen-year-old who, along with two other juveniles, pointed a paintball gun towards an individual and demanded he give them all of his belongings. Id. at 6, 11–13. When the police found the defendant, he did not have the weapon or any of the stolen property on him. Id. at 7. The court stated that although a threat of violence had occurred, no actual violence had taken place. Id. at 12. Similarly, the defendants did not commit the acts in a particularly aggressive manner. Id. [Return to Text]

78. Id. at 11–13. [Return to Text]

79. See Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 790. [Return to Text]

80. Id. (quoting Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2347(d)(4)).  Samuel believed that subsection (d)(4) of the statute required offenses outside of the pending crimes charged.  Id.  Therefore, Samuel argued that when the district court included the current charges in its analysis of the fourth factor, the current charges were repetitive.  Id. [Return to Text]

81. Id. [Return to Text]

82. See id. [Return to Text]

83. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2347 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess. 2021). [Return to Text]

84. See Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 790. [Return to Text]

85. See id. [Return to Text]

86. Id. While there are eight factors included in section 38-2347(d), this Comment only analyzes the factors at issue in this opinion. [Return to Text]

87. Id. [Return to Text]

88. Id. [Return to Text]

89. Id. [Return to Text]

90. Id. [Return to Text]

91. Id. [Return to Text]

92. Id. [Return to Text]

93. Id. at 790–91. See cases cited supra note 38. [Return to Text]

94. Compare In re D.D.M., 249 P.3d 5, 11–13 (Kan. 2011), with Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 790. In In re D.D.M., the district court found that because the crimes committed were not off-grid felonies, and because the juvenile had spent less than one year in a rehabilitation facility, rehabilitation at a juvenile facility was better suited for this defendant rather than adult prosecution. In re D.D.M., 249 P.3d at 8. [Return to Text]

95. Compare In re D.D.M., 249 P.3d at 11–13, with Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 790. [Return to Text]

96. Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 790. Kansas Statute section 38-2347(d)(1) provides that the court should consider “whether the protection of the community requires prosecution as an adult or designating the proceeding as an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2347(d)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess. 2021). [Return to Text]

97. Vonachen, 476 P.3d at 790. [Return to Text]

98. Id. [Return to Text]

99. Id. at 790–91. The district court explained its ruling, stating that it “must find, with deep reluctance but complete certainty that the interests of the community would be better served by criminal prosecution of this [then] 15-year-old-child. Accordingly, this court finds that there is a preponderance of evidence that [Samuel] should be prosecuted as an adult for the offenses charged.’” Id. at 791 (alteration in original). [Return to Text]

100. Id. [Return to Text]